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AD-A268  979 


Defense  Strategy  for  the  1990s: 
The  Regional  Defense  Strategy 


Secretary  of  Defense  Q 
Dick  Cheney  lO 


Dick  Cheney 
January  1993 


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.AUG  2  5  1993 

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Defense  Strategy  for  the  1990s: 
The  Regional  Defense  Strategy 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION . 1 

I.  DEFENSE  POLICY  GOALS  . 3 

n.  THE  REGIONAL  DEFENSE  STRATEGY . 5 

Regional  Focus 

Underlying  Strategic  Concepts 
Planning  for  Uncertainty 


Shaping  the  Future  Security  Environment 
Strategic  Depth 
Continued  U.S.  Leadership 

Enduring  Requirements 
Alliances 

High-Quality  Personnel 
Technological  Superiority 

Elements  of  the  Regional  Defense  Strategy 
Strategic  Deterrence  and  Defense 
Forward  Presence 
Crisis  Response 
Reconstitution 

Translating  Elements  into  Forces  &  Programs 

ffl.  REGIONAL  GOALS  AND  CHALLENGES . 19 

Europe 

East  Asia/Pacific 

The  Middle  East/Persian  Gulf  and  South  Asia 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan  Africa 


CONCLUSION 


27 


INTRODUCTION 


The  past  four  years  have  seen  extraordinary  changes  abroad  as  the  Cold 
War  drew  to  a  close.  We  have  entered  a  new  strategic  era.  The  collapse  of  the 
Soviet  Union  -  the  disintegration  of  the  internal  as  well  as  the  external  empire,  and 
die  discrediting  of  Communism  as  an  ideology  with  global  pretensions  and 
influence  -  fundamentally  altered,  but  did  not  eliminate,  the  challenges  ahead.  The 
integration  of  the  leading  democracies  into  a  U.S.-led  system  of  collective  security, 
and  the  prospects  of  expanding  that  system,  significantly  enhance  our  international 
position  and  provide  a  crucial  legacy  for  future  peace.  Our  national  strategy  has 
shifted  from  a  focus  on  a  global  threat  to  one  on  regional  challenges  and 
opportunities.  We  have  moved  from  Containment  to  the  new  Regional  Defense 
Strategy. 

The  changes  made  over  the  past  four  years  have  set  the  nation  on  a  solid 
path  to  secure  and  extend  the  opportunities  and  hopes  of  this  new  era.  America  and 
its  allies  now  have  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  preserve  with  greater  ease  a 
security  environment  within  which  our  democratic  ideals  can  prosper.  Where  once 
a  European-wide  war,  potentially  leading  to  nuclear  exchange,  was  perhaps  only  a 
few  weeks  and  miles  away,  today  such  a  threat  has  fallen  back  and  would  take 
years  to  rekindle.  With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  there  are  no  global  threats  and  no 
significant  hostile  alliances.  We  have  a  marked  lead  in  critical  areas  of  warfare. 

Our  alliances,  built  during  our  struggle  of  Containment,  are  one  of  the  great  sources 
of  our  strength  in  this  new  era.  They  represent  a  democratic  “zone  of  peace,”  a 
community  of  democratic  nations  bound  together  by  a  web  of  political,  economic, 
and  security  ties.  This  zone  of  peace  offers  a  framework  for  security  not  through 
competitive  rivalries  in  arms,  but  through  cooperative  approaches  and  collective 
security  institutions.  The  combination  of  these  trends  has  given  our  nation  and  our 
alliances  great  depth  for  our  strategic  position. 

Simply  put,  it  is  the  intent  of  the  new  Regional  Defense  Strategy  to  enable 
the  U.S.  to  lead  in  shaping  an  uncertain  future  so  as  to  preserve  and  enhance  this 
strategic  depth  won  at  such  great  pains.  This  will  require  us  to  strengthen  our 
alliances  and  to  extend  the  zone  of  peace  to  include  the  newly  independent  nations 
of  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union,  as  these  now-fragile  states  succeed 
in  their  struggle  to  build  free  societies  and  free  markets  out  of  the  ruin  of 
Communism.  Together  with  our  allies,  we  must  preclude  hostile  nondemocratic 
powers  from  dominating  regions  critical  to  our  interests  and  otherwise  work  to 
build  an  international  environment  conducive  to  our  values.  Yet,  even  as  we  hope 
to  increasingly  rely  on  collective  approaches  to  solve  international  problems,  we 
recognize  that  a  collective  effort  will  not  always  be  timely  and,  in  the  absence  of 
U.S.  leadership,  may  not  gel.  Where  the  stakes  so  merit,  we  must  have  forces 
ready  to  protect  our  critical  interests. 

Our  fundamental  strategic  position  and  choices  as  a  nation  are  thus  very 
different  from  those  we  have  faced  in  the  past.  The  choices  ahead  of  us  will  reset 
the  nation's  direction  for  the  next  century.  We  have  today  a  compelling  opportunity 
to  meet  our  defense  needs  at  lower  cost  But  as  we  do  so,  we  must  be  guided  by  a 
strategy  that  recognizes  that  our  domestic  life  cannot  flourish  if  we  are  beset  by 
foreign  crises.  We  must  not  squander  the  position  of  security  we  achieved  at  great 


sacrifice  through  the  Cold  War,  nor  eliminate  our  ability  to  shape  an  uncertain 
future  security  environment  in  ways  favorable  to  us  and  those  who  share  our 
values. 


2 


Guided  by  the  new  strategy,  we  are  restructuring  our  forces  to  meet  the 
essential  demands  of  strategic  deterrence  and  defense,  forward  presence,  crisis 
response,  and  reconstitution.  As  we  do  so,  we  are  reducing  our  forces  significantly 
—  by  more  than  a  million  military  and  civilian  personnel.  These  reductions  will 
reduce  force  structure  to  its  lowest  level  in  terms  of  manpower  since  before  the 
Korean  War  and  spending  to  the  lowest  percentage  of  GNP  since  before  the  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor.  Yet  even  as  we  reduce  our  forces  in  size  overall,  we  must  not 
carelessly  destroy  their  quality  or  their  technological  superiority.  Along  with 
alliances,  high-quality  personnel  and  technological  superiority  represent  capabilities 
that  would  take  decades  to  restore  if  foolishly  lost  in  this  time  of  reductions. 

Even  in  this  time  of  downsizing,  we  must  retain  capable  military  fences. 

For  the  world  remains  unpredictable  and  well-armed;  causes  fen  conflict  persist, 
and  we  have  not  eliminated  age-old  temptations  for  nondemocratic  powers  to  turn  to 
force  or  intimidation  to  achieve  their  ends.  We  have  sought  through  the  Regional 
Defense  Strategy  to  anticipate  challenges  and  opportunities  yet  to  come,  to  shape  a 
future  of  continued  progress,  and  to  preclude  reversals  or  the  emergence  of  new 
threats.  This  document  discusses  the  new  strategy  in  some  depth  and  is  intended  as 
a  contribution  to  a  national  dialogue  that  very  much  needs  to  continue  as  we  look  to 
protecting  the  nation’s  interests  in  the  1990s,  and  beyond. 


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I.  DEFENSE  POLICY  GOALS 


The  national  security  interests  of  the  United  States  are  enduring:  the  survival 
of  the  United  States  as  a  free  and  independent  nation,  with  its  fundamental  values 
intact  and  its  institutions  and  people  secure;  a  healthy  and  growing  U.S.  economy 
to  ensure  opportunity  for  individual  prosperity  and  resources  for  national  endeavors 
at  home  and  abroad;  healthy,  cooperative  and  politically  vigorous  relations  with 
allies  and  friendly  nations;  and  a  stable  and  secure  world,  where  political  and 
economic  freedom,  human  rights  and  democratic  institutions  flourish. 

These  national  security  interests  can  be  translated  into  four  mutually 
supportive  strategic  goals  that  guide  our  overall  defense  efforts: 

•  Our  most  fundamental  goal  is  to  deter  or  defeat  attack  from  whatever 
source,  against  the  United  States,  its  citizens  and  forces,  and  to  honor  our 
historic  and  treaty  commitments. 

•  The  second  goal  is  to  strengthen  and  extend  the  system  of  defense 
arrangements  that  binds  democratic  and  like-minded  nations  together  in 
common  defense  against  aggression,  builds  habits  of  cooperation,  avoids 
the  renationalization  of  security  policies,  and  provides  security  at  lower 
costs  and  with  lower  risks  for  all.  Our  preference  for  a  collective  response 
to  preclude  threats  or,  if  necessary,  to  deal  with  them  is  a  key  feature  of  our 
Regional  Defense  Strategy. 

•  The  third  goal  is  to  preclude  any  hostile  power  from  dominating  a  region 
critical  to  our  interests,  and  also  thereby  to  strengthen  the  barriers  against 
the  reemergence  of  a  global  threat  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  and 
our  allies.  These  regions  include  Europe,  East  Asia,  the  Middle 
East/Persian  Gulf,  and  Latin  America.  Consolidated,  nondemocratic  control 
of  the  resources  of  such  a  critical  region  could  generate  a  significant  threat  to 
our  security. 

•  The  fourth  goal  is  to  help  preclude  conflict  by  reducing  sources  of  regional 
instability  and  to  limit  violence  should  conflict  occur.  Within  the  broader 
national  security  policy  of  encouraging  the  spread  and  consolidation  of 
democratic  government  and  open  economic  systems,  the  Defense 
Department  furthers  these  ends  through  efforts  to  counter  terrorism,  drug 
trafficking,  and  other  threats  to  internal  democratic  order,  assistance  to 
peacekeeping  efforts;  the  provision  of  humanitarian  and  security  assistance; 
limits  on  the  spread  of  militarily  significant  technology,  particularly  the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  along  with  the  means  to 
deliver  them;  and  the  use  of  defense-to-defense  contacts  to  assist  in 
strengthening  civil-military  institutions  and  encourage  reductions  in  the 
economic  burden  of  military  spending. 

To  reach  these  goals,  the  United  States  must  show  the  leadership  necessary 
to  encomage  sustained  cooperation  among  major  democratic  powers.  The 
alternative  would  be  to  leave  our  critical  interests  and  the  security  of  our  friends 
dependent  upon  individual  efforts  that  could  be  duplicative,  competitive,  or 
ineffective.  We  also  must  encourage  and  assist  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  the  other  new 


states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  in  establishing  democratic  political  systems  and 
fixe  markets  so  they  too  can  join  the  democratic  “zone  of  peace.” 

But  while  we  favor  collective  action  to  respond  to  threats  and  challenges  in 
this  new  era,  a  collective  response  will  not  always  be  timely  and,  in  the  absence  of 
U.S.  leadership,  may  not  gel.  While  the  United  States  cannot  become  the  world’s 
policeman  and  assume  responsibility  for  solving  every  international  security 
problem,  neither  can  we  allow  our  critical  interests  to  depend  solely  on  international 
mechanisms  that  can  be  blocked  by  countries  whose  interests  may  be  very  different 
from  our  own.  Where  our  allies'  interests  are  directly  affected,  we  must  expect 
diem  to  take  an  appropriate  share  of  the  responsibility,  and  in  some  cases  play  die 
leading  role;  but  we  must  maintain  the  capabilities  for  addressing  selectively  those 
security  problems  that  threaten  our  own  interests.  Such  capabilities  are  essential  to 
our  ability  to  lead,  and  should  international  support  prove  sluggish  or  inadequate,  to 
act  independendy,  as  necessary,  to  protect  our  critical  interests.  History  suggests 
that  effective  multilateral  action  is  most  likely  to  come  about  in  response  to  U.S. 
leadership,  not  as  an  alternative  to  it 

We  cannot  lead  if  we  fail  to  maintain  the  high  quality  of  our  forces  as  we 
reduce  and  restructure  them.  As  a  nation  we  have  never  before  succeeded  in  pacing 
reductions  without  endangering  our  interests.  We  must  proceed  expeditiously,  but 
at  a  pace  that  avoids  breaking  die  force  or  sending  misleading  signals  about  our 
intentions  to  friends  or  potential  aggressors.  An  effective  ability  to  reconstitute  our 
forces  is  important  as  well,  since  it  signals  that  no  potential  rival  could  quickly  or 
easily  gain  a  predominant  military  position. 

At  the  end  of  World  War  I,  and  again  to  a  lesser  extent  at  the  end  of  World 
War  II,  the  United  States  as  a  nation  made  the  mistake  of  believing  that  we  had 
achieved  a  kind  of  permanent  security,  that  a  transformation  of  the  security  order 
achieved  in  substantial  part  through  American  sacrifice  and  leadership  could  be 
sustained  without  our  leadership  and  significant  American  forces.  Today,  a  great 
challenge  has  passed;  but  other  threats  endure,  and  new  ones  will  arise.  If  we 
reduce  our  forces  carefully,  we  will  be  left  with  a  force  capable  of  implementing  the 
new  defense  strategy.  We  will  have  given  ourselves  the  means  to  lead  common 
efforts  to  meet  future  challenges  and  to  shape  the  future  environment  in  ways  that 
will  give  us  greater  security  at  lower  cost 


n.  THE  REGIONAL  DEFENSE  STRATEGY 


Regional  Focus 

The  demise  of  the  global  threat  posed  by  Soviet  Communism  leaves 
America  and  its  allies  with  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  preserve  with  greater 
ease  a  security  environment  within  which  our  democratic  ideals  can  prosper.  We 
have  shifted  our  defense  planning  from  a  focus  on  the  global  threat  posed  by  the 
Soviet  Union  to  a  focus  on  the  regional  threats  and  challenges  we  are  more  likely  to 
face  in  the  future.  At  the  same  time,  we  can  work  to  shape  the  future  environment 
in  ways  that  would  help  preclude  hostile  nondemocratic  powers  from  dominating 
regions  critical  to  us.  This  same  approach  will  also  help  to  preclude  the  emergence 
of  a  hostile  power  that  could  present  a  global  security  threat  comparable  to  the  one 
the  Soviet  Union  presented  in  the  past  Precluding  regional  threats  and  challenges 
can  strengthen  the  underpinnings  of  a  peaceful  democratic  order  in  which  nations 
are  able  to  pursue  their  legitimate  interests  without  fear  of  military  domination. 

In  this  mare  secure  international  environment  there  will  be  enhanced 
opportunities  for  political,  economic,  environmental,  social,  and  security  issues  to 
be  resolved  through  new  or  revitalized  international  organizations,  including  the 
United  Nations,  or  regional  arrangements.  But  the  world  remains  unpredictable 
and  well-armed,  causes  for  conflict  persist,  and  we  have  not  eliminated  age-old 
temptations  for  nondemocratic  powers  to  turn  to  force  or  intimidation  to  achieve 
their  ends.  We  must  not  stand  back  and  allow  a  new  global  threat  to  emerge  or 
leave  a  vacuum  in  a  region  critical  to  our  interests.  Such  a  vacuum  could  make 
countries  there  feel  vulnerable,  which  in  turn  could  lead  to  excessive  military 
capabilities  and  an  unsteady  balance  of  one  against  another.  If  we  do  stand  back  it 
will  be  much  harder  to  achieve  the  enhanced  international  cooperation  for  which  we 
hope. 


Underlying  Strategic  Concepts 

The  Department  of  Defense  does  not  decide  when  our  nation  will  commit 
force.  However,  decisions  today  about  the  size  and  characteristics  of  the  forces  we 
are  building  for  tomorrow  can  influence  whether  threats  to  our  interests  emerge 
and,  if  they  do  emerge,  whether  we  are  able  to  defeat  them  decisively.  Four 
concepts  illustrate  tins  relationship. 


Planning  for  Uncertainty.  An  unavoidable  challenge  for  defense 
planners  is  that  we  must  start  development  today  of  forces  to  counter  threats  still  so 
distant  into  the  future  that  they  cannot  be  confidently  predicted.  Events  of  the  last 
few  years  demonstrate  concretely  how  quickly  and  unexpectedly  political  trends  can 
fe verse  themselves.  Our  ability  to  predict  political  alignments  and  military 
capabilities  weakens  as  we  look  farther  into  the  future. 

Yet  decisions  about  military  forces  cannot  be  based  on  a  short-term  planning 
horizon.  The  military  capabilities  that  we  have  today  and  the  ones  we  will  have  for 
the  next  few  years  are  largely  the  product  of  decisions  made  a  decade  or  more  ago. 
Much  of  the  capability  that  we  are  eliminating  now  cannot  be  restored  quickly,  and 
precipitous  cuts  would  do  long-lasting  damage,  even  to  the  capabilities  that  we 
retain. 


Thus,  we  must  reduce  and  reshape  our  forces  not  only  to  respond  to  the 
near-term  threats  that  we  can  measure  clearly  today,  or  even  to  the  trends  most 
likely  to  continue.  We  also  must  hedge  against  the  emergence  of  unexpected 
threats,  the  reversal  of  favorable  trends,  or  even  fundamental  changes  in  the  nature 
of  our  challenges.  Risk  can  never  be  entirely  eliminated.  The  limits  on  our  ability 
to  predict  the  future  must  be  recognized,  and  flexibility  to  reduce  the  consequences 
of  being  wrong  must  be  built  into  even  our  current  forces  and  programs. 

We  are  building  defense  forces  today  for  a  future  that  is  particularly 
uncertain,  given  the  magnitude  of  recent  changes  in  the  security  environment. 
Fundamentally,  we  are  striving  to  provide  a  future  President  with  the  capabilities 
five,  ten  or  fifteen  years  from  now  to  counter  threats  or  pursue  interests  that  cannot 
be  defined  with  precision  today.  While  we  can  safely  reduce  force  structure  and  the 
pace  of  modernization,  we  must  retain  the  ability  to  protect  our  interests  and,  by  so 
doing,  to  help  deter  unwanted  reversals. 


Shaping  the  Future  Security  Environment.  America  cannot  base  its 
future  security  on  a  shaky  record  of  prediction  or  even  on  a  prudent  recognition  of 
uncertainty.  Sound  defense  planning  seeks  as  well  to  help  shape  the  future.  Our 
strategy  is  designed  to  preclude  threats  and  to  encourage  trends  that  advance  U.S. 
security  objectives  in  the  future.  This  is  not  simply  within  our  means;  it  is  critical  to 
our  future  security. 

The  containment  strategy  we  pursued  for  the  past  forty  years  successfully 
shaped  the  world  we  see  today.  By  our  refusal  to  be  intimidated  by  Soviet  military 
power,  we  and  our  allies  molded  a  world  in  which  Communism  was  forced  to 
confront  its  contradictions.  Even  as  we  and  our  allies  carried  the  defense  burden 
required  in  the  Cold  War,  democracy  was  able  to  develop  and  flourish. 

One  of  the  primary  tasks  we  face  today  in  shaping  the  future  is  carrying 
long  standing  alliances  into  die  new  era,  and  turning  old  enmities  into  new 
cooperative  relationships.  If  we  and  other  leading  democracies  continue  to  build  a 
democratic  security  community,  a  much  safer  world  is  likely  to  emerge.  If  we  act 
separately,  many  other  problems  could  result  If  we  can  assist  former  Warsaw  Pact 
countries,  including  the  newly  independent  states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union, 
particularly  Russia  and  Ukraine,  in  choosing  a  steady  course  of  democratic 
progress  and  reduced  military  forces  subject  to  responsible,  civilian  democratic 
control,  we  will  have  successfully  secured  the  fruits  of  forty  years  of  effort  Our 
goal  should  be  to  bring  a  democratic  Russia  and  the  other  new  democracies  into  the 
defense  community  of  democratic  nations  so  that  they  can  become  a  force  for  peace, 
democracy,  and  freedom  not  only  in  Europe  but  also  in  other  critical  regions  of  the 
world. 


Cooperative  defense  arrangements  enhance  security,  while  reducing  the 
defense  burden  for  everyone.  In  die  absence  of  effective  defense  cooperation, 
regional  rivalries  could  lead  to  tensions  or  even  hostilities  that  would  threaten  to 
bring  critical  regions  under  hostile  domination.  It  is  not  in  our  interest  or  those  of 
die  other  democracies  to  return  to  earlier  periods  in  which  multiple  military  powers 
balanced  one  against  another  in  what  passed  for  security  structures,  while  regional, 
or  even  global  peace  hung  in  the  balance.  As  in  the  past,  such  struggles  might 
eventually  force  the  United  States  at  much  higher  cost  to  protect  its  interests  and 
counter  the  potential  development  of  a  new  global  threat. 


7 


Maintaining  highly  capable  forces  also  is  critical  to  sustaining  the  U.S. 
leadership  with  which  we  can  shape  the  future.  Such  leadership  supports  collective 
defense  arrangements  and  precludes  hostile  competitors  from  challenging  our 
critical  interests.  Our  fundamental  belief  in  democracy  and  human  rights  gives 
other  nations  confidence  that  our  significant  military  power  threatens  no  one's 
aspirations  for  peaceful  democratic  progress. 

Our  forces  also  can  shape  the  future  environment  by  performing  the  "non- 
tradidonal"  roles  of  humanitarian  or  peacekeeping  operations.  Generally  such 
situations  are  of  international  concern,  and  we  would  expect  to  be  part  of  a 
commensurate  multinational  effort;  however,  U.S.  leadership  may  be  crucial  to 
catalyze  such  action,  and  we  may  have  unique  capabilities  that  would  appropriately 
complement  others'  forces. 

Our  ability  to  shape  the  future  rests  not  only  on  our  efforts  to  keep  closed 
the  door  to  aggression  and  military  intimidation;  it  rests  also  on  our  ability  to 
provide  the  example  necessary  for  others  to  take  positive,  reciprocal  steps.  The 
President’s  nuclear  initiatives  of  the  fall  and  winter  of  1991-92  induced  the  former 
Soviet  Union  to  take  positive  reciprocating  steps  that  will  help  reduce  the  remaining 
threat  posed  by  nuclear  forces  on  the  territory  of  the  former  Soviet  Union.  These 
initiatives  made  possible  the  U.S.-Russian  agreements  of  June  1992  and 
subsequent  signing  of  the  START  II  treaty  in  January  1993.  Similarly,  NATO’s 
new  strategy  not  only  reflects  an  adjustment  to  the  reduced  threat  environment  in 
Europe  but  equally  it  reassures  our  former  adversaries  of  the  truly  defensive  nature 
of  the  NATO  alliance.  Through  such  initiatives  we  can  solidify  the  gains  achieved 
through  START,  START  II  and  CEE  and  go  beyond  them. 

Our  ability  to  reduce  sources  of  regional  instability  and  to  limit  violence 
should  conflict  occur  also  is  critical  to  shaping  the  environment.  This  includes,  for 
example,  updating  our  strategy  to  counter  die  proliferation  of  militarily  significant 
technology,  particularly  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  along  with 
die  means  to  deliver  them.  Our  traditional  export  control  efforts  must  not  only  be 
updated  and  strengthened  in  this  new  era,  but  supplemented  by  political  dissuasion, 
bilateral  and  multilateral  negotiations,  and  inspection  and  destruction  missions,  as 
illustrated  in  the  case  of  Iraq. 


Strategic  Depth.  America's  strategic  position  is  stronger  than  it  has  been 
for  decades.  Today,  there  is  no  challenger  to  peaceful  democratic  order  similar  to 
that  posed  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  die  Warsaw  Pact  There  are  no  significant 
hostile  alliances.  To  the  contrary,  the  strongest  and  most  capable  countries  in  the 
world  remain  our  friends.  The  threat  of  global,  even  nuclear  war,  once  posed  by 
massive  Warsaw  Pact  forces  poised  at  the  inter-German  border,  first  receded 
hundreds  of  miles  east  and  has  since  been  transformed  into  the  promise  of  a  new 
era  of  strategic  cooperation. 

Not  only  has  our  position  improved  markedly  with  respect  to  the  passing  of 
a  global  challenge,  but  our  strategic  position  has  improved  in  regional  contexts  as 
well.  For  the  near-term,  we  and  our  allies  possess  sufficient  capabilities  to  counter 
threats  in  critical  regions.  Soviet  Communism  no  longer  exacerbates  local  conflicts, 
and  we  need  no  longer  be  concerned  that  an  otherwise  remote  problem  could  affect 
the  balance  of  power  between  us  and  a  hostile  global  challenger.  We  have  won 
great  depth  for  our  strategic  position. 


8 


In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  reflect  in  our  strategy  the  fact  that  the 
international  system  is  no  longer  characterized  by  Cold  War  bipolarity.  The  Cold 
War  required  the  United  States  and  its  allies  to  be  prepared  to  contain  the  spread  of 
Soviet  power  on  a  global  basis.  Developments  in  even  remote  areas  could  affect  the 
United  States’  relative  position  in  the  world,  and  therefore  often  required  a  U.S. 
response.  The  United  States  remains  a  nation  with  global  interests,  but  we  must 
reexamine  in  light  of  the  new  defense  strategy  whether  and  to  what  extent  particular 
challenges  engage  our  interests.  These  changes  and  the  growing  strength  of  our 
friends  and  allies  will  allow  us  to  be  more  selective  in  determining  the  extent  to 
which  U.S.  forces  must  be  committed  to  safeguard  shared  interests. 

The  first  major  conflict  of  the  post-Cold  War  era  preserved  our  strategic 
position  in  one  of  die  regions  of  the  world  critical  to  our  interests.  Our  success  in 
organizing  an  international  coalition  in  the  Persian  Gulf  against  Saddam  Hussein 
kept  a  critical  region  from  the  control  of  a  ruthless  dictator  bent  on  developing 
nuclear,  biological  and  chemical  weapons  and  harming  Western  interests.  Instead 
of  a  mare  radical  Middle  East/Persian  Gulf  region  under  Saddam's  influence, 
Saddam  struggles  to  retain  control  in  Iraq,  Iraq’s  dangerous  military  has  been 
greatly  damaged,  our  ties  with  moderate  states  are  stronger,  energy  resources  are 
secure,  and  significant  progress  has  been  made  in  the  Arab-Israeli  peace  process. 

Our  strategy  is  designed  to  preserve  this  position  by  keeping  our  alliances 
strong  and  our  threats  small.  Our  tools  include  political  and  economic  measures 
and  others  such  as  peacekeeping  operations,  security  assistance,  defense-to-defense 
contacts,  humanitarian  aid  and  intelligence  assistance,  as  well  as  security  measures 
to  prevent  the  emergence  of  a  nondemocratic  aggressor  in  critical  regions.  We 
bring  to  this  task  our  considerable  moral  influence  as  the  world's  leading 
democracy.  We  can  provide  mare  security  at  a  reduced  cost  If  a  hostile  power 
sought  to  present  a  regional  challenge  again,  or  if  a  new,  antagonistic  global  threat 
or  alliance  emerged  in  the  future,  we  would  have  die  ability  to  counter  it.  But  the 
investments  required  to  maintain  the  strategic  depth  that  we  won  through  forty  years 
of  the  Cold  War  are  much  smaller  than  those  it  took  to  secure  this  strategic  depth  or 
those  that  would  be  required  if  we  lost  it 


Continued  U.S.  Leadership.  U.S.  leadership,  essential  for  the 
successful  resolution  of  the  Cold  War,  remains  critical  to  achieving  our  long-term 
goals  in  this  new  era.  The  United  States  continues  to  prefer  to  address  hostile, 
nondemocratic  threats  to  our  interests  wherever  possible  through  collective  security 
efforts  that  take  advantage  of  the  strength  of  our  allies  and  friends.  However, 
sustained  U.S.  leadership  will  be  essential  for  maintaining  those  alliances  and  for 
otherwise  protecting  our  interests. 

Recognition  that  the  United  States  is  capable  of  opposing  regional 
aggression  mil  be  an  important  factor  in  inducing  nations  to  work  together  to 
stabilize  crises  and  resist  or  defeat  aggression.  For  most  countries,  a  general 
interest  in  international  stability  and  security  will  not  be  enough  to  induce  them  to 
put  themselves  at  risk  simply  in  the  hope  that  others  will  join  them.  Only  a  nation 
that  is  strong  enough  to  act  decisively  can  provide  the  leadership  needed  to 
encourage  others  to  resist  aggression.  Collective  security  failed  in  the  1930s 
because  no  strong  power  was  willing  to  provide  the  leadership  behind  which  less 
powerful  countries  could  rally  against  Fascism.  It  worked  in  the  Gulf  because  the 


United  States  was  willing  and  able  to  provide  that  leadership.  Thus,  even  when  a 
broad  potential  coalition  exists,  leadership  will  be  necessary  to  realize  it 

The  perceived  capability  --  which  depends  upon  the  actual  ability  --  of  the 
United  States  to  act  independently,  if  necessary,  is  thus  an  important  factor  even  in 
those  cases  where  we  do  not  actually  use  it  It  will  not  always  be  incumbent  upon 
us  to  assume  a  leadership  role.  In  some  cases,  we  will  promote  the  assumption  of 
leadership  by  others,  such  as  the  United  Nations  or  regional  organizations.  In  the 
end,  there  is  no  contradiction  between  U.S.  leadership  and  multilateral  action; 
history  shows  precisely  that  U.S.  leadership  is  the  necessary  prerequisite  for 
effective  international  action.  We  will,  therefore,  not  ignore  the  need  to  be  prepared 
to  protea  our  critical  interests  and  honor  our  commitments  with  only  limited 
additional  help,  or  even  alone,  if  necessary.  A  future  President  will  need  options 
allowing  him  to  lead  and,  where  the  international  reaction  proves  sluggish  or 
inadequate,  to  act  independently  to  protect  our  critical  interests. 

As  a  nation,  we  have  paid  dearly  in  the  past  for  letting  our  capabilities  fall 
and  our  will  be  questioned.  There  is  a  moment  in  time  when  a  smaller,  ready  force 
can  preclude  an  arms  race,  a  hostile  move  or  a  conflict  Once  lost  that  moment 
cannot  be  recaptured  by  many  thousands  of  soldiers  poised  on  the  edge  of  combat. 
Our  efforts  to  rearm  and  to  understand  our  danger  before  World  War  II  came  too 
late  to  spare  us  and  others  a  global  conflagration.  Five  years  after  our  resounding 
global  victory  in  World  War  H,  we  were  nearly  pushed  ofi  the  Korean  peninsula  by 
a  third  rate  power.  We  erred  in  the  past  when  we  failed  to  maintain  needed  forces. 
And  we  paid  dearly  for  our  error. 


Enduring  Refluiremenls 

The  new  defense  strategy  with  its  regional  focus  reflects  the  need  to  pay 
special  attention  to  three  enduring  requirements  of  our  national  security  posture. 
Each  requires  careful,  long-term  attention,  the  investment  of  defense  resources,  and 
supportive  operating  practices;  each  represents  key  strengths  that  cannot  be  readily 
restored  should  they  be  lost 


Alliances.  Our  alliance  structure  is  perhaps  our  nation’s  most  significant 
achievement  since  the  Second  World  War.  It  represents  a  “silent  victory”  of 
building  long-standing  alliances  and  friendships  with  nations  that  constitute  a 
prosperous,  largely  democratic,  market-oriented  zone  of  peace  and  prosperity  that 
encompasses  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  world’s  economy.  Defense  cooperation 
among  die  democracies  has  not  only  deterred  external  threats,  it  has  provided  an 
environment  in  which  we  and  our  allies  have  peacefully  developed  and  prospered. 
The  United  States  will  maintain  and  nurture  its  friendships  and  alliances  in  Europe, 
East  Asia/Pacific,  the  Middle  East/Persian  Gulf,  Latin  America  and  elsewhere. 

The  growing  strength  of  our  friends  and  allies  will  make  it  possible  for  them 
to  assume  greater  responsibilities  for  our  mutual  security  interests.  We  will  work 
with  them  towards  this  end,  including  reductions  in  U.S.  military  forces  stationed 
overseas,  particularly  as  our  friends  and  allies  are  able  to  assume  greater 
responsibilities.  There  will  remain,  however,  a  significant  role  for  U.S.  forward 
presence,  including  stationed  forces,  and  changes  must  be  managed  carefully  to 
ensure  that  reductions  are  not  mistakenly  perceived  as  a  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
commitment  In  addition,  certain  situations  like  the  crisis  leading  to  the  Gulf  War 


are  likely  to  engender  ad  hoc  coalitions.  We  should  plan  to  maximize  the  value  of 
such  coalitions.  This  may  include  specialized  roles  for  our  forces  as  well  as 
developing  cooperative  practices  with  others.  Specific  issues  concerning  alliances 
and  coalitions  are  treated  in  detail  in  Part  m,  “Regional  Goals  and  Challenges.” 


High-Oualitv  Personnel.  Our  victory  in  the  Gulf  War  demonstrated 
impressively  the  importance  of  high-quality  personnel  and  effective  leaders.  The 
highly  trained,  highly  motivated  all-volunteer  total  force  we  have  worked  so  hard  to 
build  is  the  key  to  maintaining  our  future  military  leadership  and  capabilities.  We 
also  require  high-quality  career  civilians,  especially  in  the  managerial,  scientific  and 
technical  fields.  Our  challenge  for  the  future  is  to  preserve  the  high-quality  active, 
reserve,  and  civilian  force  we  have  worked  so  hard  to  build. 

The  Gulf  War  tested  the  training,  discipline,  and  morale  of  our  military 
forces  and  they  performed  superbly.  To  continue  to  attract  the  highest  quality 
people,  we  must  provide  challenging  and  realistic  training  supplemented  by 
advanced  training  techniques  such  as  interactive  simulation.  We  also  must  provide 
tire  quality  of  life  they  and  their  families  deserve,  including  keeping  the  amount  of 
time  military  units  are  deployed  away  from  home  at  reasonable  levels. 

High-quality  personnel  require  outstanding  military  leadership.  Our  success 
in  the  Gulf  reflected  such  leadership.  We  must  continue  to  train  our  military  leaders 
in  joint  operations  and  in  cooperative  efforts  with  the  forces  of  many  different 
nations.  They  also  must  be  given  the  opportunity  and  encouragement  to  pursue 
innovative  doctrine  for  operations  and  new  approaches  to  problems. 

Identifying  the  core  military  competencies  that  will  be  most  important  in  the 
future  will  be  among  the  highest  priorities  of  our  military  leadership.  New 
equipment  is  not  sufficient.  Innovation  in  its  use  also  is  necessary.  Our 
understanding  of  warfare  and  the  way  we  intend  to  defend  our  interests  as  a  nation 
must  continually  develop  and  evolve  in  the  ongoing  military-technological 
revolution.  Future  challenges  will  require  the  continued  mastery  of  critical  areas  of 
warfare,  but  we  also  require  mastery  of  evolving  capabilities,  perhaps  replacing 
some  ihat  are  critical  today.  An  essential  task  will  be  to  begin  preparing  for 
tomorrow's  challenges  while  making  hard  decisions  about  capabilities  we  need  no 
longer  emphasize. 


Technological  Superiority.  The  onset  of  a  new  military-technological 
revolution  presents  continued  challenges  not  only  in  the  realm  of  technological 
superiority  but  also  in  the  way  we  organize,  train,  and  employ  our  military  forces. 
Tire  Gulf  War  made  clear  the  early  promise  of  this  revolution,  emphasizing  the 
importance  of  recent  breakthroughs  in  low-observable,  information  gathering  and 
processing,  precision  strike,  and  other  key  technologies.  Our  investment  in 
ihnovation  must  be  sustained  at  levels  necessary  to  assure  that  U.S.-fielded  forces 
dominate  the  military-technological  revolution. 

We  must  maintain  superiority  in  key  areas  of  technology.  It  is  critical, 
therefore,  that  we  identify  the  highest  leverage  technologies  and  pursue  those  with 
vigor.  U.S.  forces  must  retain  a  decisive  lead  in  those  technologies  critical  on 
future  battlefields.  To  provide  such  high  quality  forces  for  tomorrow,  we  must,  in 
the  first  instance,  maintain  a  robust  science  and  technology  program,  balanced 
between  a  core  of  broad  sustaining  programs  and  selected  ‘"thrusts”  that  contribute 


directly  to  high  priority  needs.  This  must  be  complemented  by  technology 
safeguards  and  export  control  regimes  targeted,  in  coordination  with  our  friends 
and  allies,  on  particular  proliferation  concerns. 

Robust  science  and  technology  alone  will  not  maintain  our  qualitative 
advantage.  New  technologies  must  be  incorporated  into  weapons  systems  that  are 
provided  in  numbers  sufficient  for  doctrine  and  tactics  to  be  developed.  To  do  this 
without  large-scale  production  will  require  innovations  in  training  technologies  and 
the  technology  testing  process.  Through  simulation,  we  can  investigate  before  we 
buy  new  weapons  or  systems  how  well  they  may  perform  on  the  battlefield.  In 
addition,  we  must  encourage  new  manufacturing  processes,  facilities,  and 
equipment  This  will  be  increasingly  important  over  time. 

All  of  this,  however,  does  not  mean  we  will  move  rapidly  into  large-scale 
production  of  numerous  new  weapons  systems.  We  will  be  procuring  less  because 
our  armed  forces  will  be  smaller,  and  because  the  need  for  modernization  is  reduced 
with  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union.  During  the  Cold  War,  time  and  production 
pressures  created  by  Soviet  weapons  developments  resulted  in  a  defense  acquisition 
process  geared  to  early  production  of  new  systems,  often  without  as  thorough  a 
prior  development  as  desired.  Science  and  technology  can  be  a  much  more 
important  factor  in  the  overall  acquisition  process  -  doing  more  than  before  to 
“prove  out”  new  technology  and  components  before  programs  enter  the  formal 
acquisition  process.  These  concepts  provide  the  basis  for  a  new  acquisition 
approach.  Nevertheless,  development  of  new  technologies  and  their  incorporation 
into  weapons  systems  through  a  more  efficient  acquisition  process  will  be  essential 
'o  provide  the  advantages  smaller  forces  will  need  to  deter  or  prevail  in  future 
conflicts. 


Elements  of  the  Regional  Defense  Strategy 

The  Regional  Defense  Strategy  seeks  to  protect  American  interests  and  to 
shape  a  more  stable  and  democratic  world.  It  does  so  by  adopting  a  regional  focus 
for  our  efforts  to  strengthen  cooperative  defense  arrangements  with  friendly  states 
and  to  preclude  hostile,  nondemocratic  powers  from  dominating  regions  of  the 
world  critical  to  us.  In  this  way  also  the  strategy  aims  to  raise  a  further  barrier  to 
the  rise  of  any  serious  global  challenge.  To  accomplish  these  goals,  we  must 
preserve  U.S.  leadership,  maintain  leading-edge  military  capabilities,  and  enhance 
collective  security  among  democratic  nations. 

The  Regional  Defense  Strategy  rests  on  four  essential  elements: 

•  Strategic  Deterrence  and  Defense  -  a  credible  strategic  nuclear  deterrent 
capability,  and  strategic  defenses  against  limited  strikes. 

•  Forward  Presence  --  forward  deployed  or  stationed  forces  (albeit  at  reduced 
levels)  to  strengthen  alliances,  show  our  resolve,  and  dissuade  challengers 
in  regions  critical  to  us. 

•  Crisis  Response  -  forces  and  mobility  to  respond  quickly  and  decisively 
with  a  range  of  options  to  regional  crises  of  concern  to  us. 

•  Reconstitution  -  the  capability  to  create  additional  new  forces  to  hedge 
against  any  renewed  global  threat. 


12 


Strategic  Deterrence  and  Defense.  Even  though  the  risk  of  a  massive 
strategic  nuclear  attack  has  decreased  significantly  with  the  rise  of  democratic  forces 
and  the  collapse  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  deterring  nuclear  attack  must  remain 
the  highest  defense  priority  of  the  nation.  It  is  the  one  area  where  our  survival  could 
be  at  risk  in  a  matter  of  moments.  U.S.  nuclear  targeting  policy  and  plans  have 
changed,  and  should  continue  to  change,  to  account  for  die  welcome  developments 
in  states  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the  farmer  Soviet  Union.  Nonetheless,  survivable 
and  flexible  U.S.  strategic  nuclear  forces  still  are  essential  to  deter  use  of  the 
modem  nuclear  forces  that  will  exist  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  even  after  START 
and  START  II  reductions  have  been  implemented.  Our  strategic  nuclear  forces  also 
provide  an  important  deterrent  hedge  against  the  possibility  of  an  unforeseen  global 
threat  emerging. 

Fundamental  changes  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  have 
eliminated  the  threat  of  massive  Soviet  aggression  launched  fiom  the  former  East 
Germany  that  required  heavy  reliance  on  the  threat  of  nuclear  weapons  for 
deterrence.  This  permits  us  to  move  into  a  new  era  in  nuclear  farces.  This  was 
evidenced  in  the  President’s  nuclear  initiatives  in  1991  and  1992,  which  made 
major  changes  in  our  tactical  nuclear  posture  and  strategic  nuclear  deterrent  forces 
designed  to  enhance  stability  while  eliminating  weapons,  to  further  reduce  the 
possibility  of  accident  or  miscalculation,  and  to  encourage  corresponding  reductions 
in  the  nuclear  posture  of  the  former  Soviet  Union. 

The  leaders  of  Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  and  Ukraine  have  stated  their  readiness 
to  eliminate  strategic  offensive  forces,  while  Russia  is  significantly  reducing  its 
force  levels.  (These  four  new  states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  are  the  only  ones 
with  strategic  nuclear  weapons  on  their  territory.  Russian  authorities  assure  us  that 
all  tactical  weapons  are  now  on  Russian  territory.)  They  recognize  the  United 
States  is  not  a  threat  and  rightly  view  strategic  forces  as  diverting  scarce  resources 
from  rebuilding  their  troubled  economies  and  complicating  die  improvement  of 
relations  with  the  West.  We  have  been  working  with  these  leaders  to  provide 
financial  and  technical  assistance  to  reduce  and  dismantle  these  nuclear  forces.  We 
already  have  some  programs  underway  to  assist  with  the  safe  and  secure 
transportation,  storage,  and  destruction  of  weapons  and  the  prevention  of  their 
proliferation.  We  should  actively  seek  additional  ways  to  further  these  ends. 

Both  the  U.S.  and  Russia  have  now  agreed  in  START  II  to  even  more 
dramatic  changes  to  their  nuclear  deterrent  forces  that  will  significantly  enhance 
stability.  For  us  these  include,  in  addition  to  reductions  to  START  levels,  fewer 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  (ICBMs),  with  the  remaining  ICBMs  having  only 
one  warhead  apiece;  and  fewer  warheads  on  our  ballistic  missile  submarines.  In 
addition,  a  substantial  number  of  bombers  will  be  oriented  primarily  toward 
conventional  missions.  In  die  end,  die  actual  number  of  warheads  will  be  roughly 
half  of  what  we  planned  to  have  under  START. 

As  we  reduce  the  size  of  our  offensive  nuclear  forces,  we  must  ensure  the 
survivability  --  and  therefore  the  essential  stability  -  of  our  strategic  deterrent  This 
will  limit  reductions  in  tire  overall  number  of  strategic  platforms.  Our  planning  also 
should  take  account  of  the  greatly  reduced  likelihood  of  a  deliberate  massive  attack 
in  die  present  international  situation  and  consider  the  danger  of  an  accidental  or 
unauthorized  attack. 


A  successful  transformation  of  Russia,  Ukraine  and  other  states  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union  to  stable  democracies  should  clearly  be  one  of  our  major 
goals.  But  we  are  not  there  yet.  Our  pursuit  of  this  goal  must  recognize  the  as  yet 
robust  strategic  nuclear  force  facing  us,  the  fragility  of  democracy  in  the  new  states 
of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  and  the  possibility  that  these  new  states  might  revert  to 
closed,  authoritarian,  and  hostile  regimes.  Our  movement  toward  this  goal  must, 
therefore,  leave  us  with  timely  and  realistic  responses  to  unanticipated  reversals  in 
our  relations  and  a  survivable  deterrent  capability. 

Strategic  forces  also  will  continue  to  support  our  global  role  and 
international  commitments,  including  our  trans-Atlantic  links  to  NATO.  Collective 
defense  allows  countries  to  rely  on  the  contributions  of  others  in  protecting  their 
mutual  interests  in  ways  that  lessen  the  risks  and  the  costs  for  all.  The  nuclear 
umbrella  that  the  United  States  has  extended  over  our  allies  has  helped  deter  attack 
successfully  for  four  decades.  This  has  been  a  risk-reducing  and  cost-saving 
measure  for  us  all;  it  is  one  we  can  afford  fiscally  to  continue  and  one  that  our 
interests  cannot  afford  to  let  lapse. 

Nuclear  weapons  cannot  be  disinvented;  and  the  threat  of  nuclear 
proliferation,  despite  our  best  efforts,  persists.  Other  countries  -  some  of  them, 
like  Iraq,  especially  hostile  and  irresponsible  -  threaten  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons. 
Some  countries  are  also  pursuing  other  highly-destructive  systems,  such  as 
chemical  and  biological  weapons.  These  developments  require  us  to  be  able  to 
deter  use  of  such  weapons,  and  to  improve  our  defense  capabilities. 

The  threats  posed  by  instability  in  nuclear  weapons  states  and  by  the  global 
proliferation  of  ballistic  missiles  have  grown  considerably.  The  threat  of  an 
accidental  or  unauthorized  missile  launch  may  increase  significantly  through  this 
decade.  The  new  technology  embodied  in  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI) 
program  has  made  ballistic  missile  defense  capability  a  realistic,  achievable,  and 
affordable  concept  We  need  to  deploy  missile  defenses  not  wily  to  protect 
ourselves  and  our  forward  deployed  farces,  but  also  to  have  the  ability  to  extend 
protection  to  others.  Like  extended  deterrence  provided  by  our  nuclear  farces, 
defenses  can  contribute  to  a  regime  of  extended  protection  for  friends  and  allies  and 
further  strengthen  a  democratic  security  community.  This  is  why,  with  the  support 
of  Congress,  as  reflected  in  the  Missile  Defense  Act,  we  have  sought  to  move 
toward  the  day  when  defenses  will  protect  the  community  of  nations  embracing 
democratic  values  from  international  outlaws  armed  with  ballistic  missiles  who  may 
not  be  deterred  by  offensive  forces  alone.  It  is  this  vision  that  is  reflected  in  our 
commitment  to  developing  a  Global  Protection  System  (GPS)  not  only  with 
traditional  friends  and  allies  but  also  with  the  emerging  democracies  of  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union. 

Deployment  of  defenses  against  limited  strikes  also  should  continue  to  be  an 
integral  element  of  our  efforts  to  curtail  ballistic  missile  proliferation.  Defenses 
undermine  the  military  utility  of  such  systems  and  should  serve  to  dampen  the 
incentive  to  acquire  ballistic  missiles.  (Further  discussion  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  issues  is  found  in  the  Crisis  Response  section.) 

The  strategic  command,  control  and  communications  system  should 
continue  to  evolve  toward  a  joint  global  structure,  ensuring  that  its  capabilities  and 
survivability  remain  appropriate  to  the  evolving  threat  and  the  smaller  forces  it  will 
support  We  also  should  take  advantage  of  the  potential  of  our  strategic  C3I 
investments  to  support  conventional  crisis  response. 


14 


In  the  decade  ahead,  we  must  adopt  the  right  combination  of  deterrent 
forces,  tactical  and  strategic,  while  creating  the  proper  balance  between  offense  and 
active  defense  to  mitigate  risk  from  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  their  means  of 
delivery,  whatever  the  source.  For  now  this  requires  retaining  ready  forces  for  a 
survivable  nuclear  deterrent,  including  tactical  forces.  In  addition,  we  must 
complete  needed  force  modernization  and  upgrades.  These  deterrent  forces  need  to 
be  complemented  with  early  introduction  of  ballistic  missile  defenses  against  limited 
strikes. 


Forward  Presence.  Our  forward  presence  helps  to  shape  the  evolving 
security  environment.  We  will  continue  to  rely  on  forward  presence  of  U.S.  forces 
to  show  U.S.  commitment  and  lend  credibility  to  our  alliances,  to  deter  aggression, 
enhance  regional  stability,  promote  U.S.  influence  and  access,  and,  when 
necessary,  provide  an  initial  crisis  response  capability.  Forward  presence  is  vital  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  system  of  collective  defense  by  which  the  United  States  has 
been  able  to  work  with  our  friends  and  allies  to  protect  our  security  interests,  while 
minimizing  the  burden  of  defense  spending  and  of  unnecessary  arms  competition. 
The  roles  that  forward  presence  plays  in  specific  regions  under  the  Regional 
Defense  Strategy  are  treated  in  detail  in  Part  m,  “Regional  Goals  and  Challenges.” 

While  we  are  prudently  reducing  the  levels  of  our  presence  very 
substantially,  it  is  increasingly  important  to  emphasize  our  intent  to  retain  adequate 
presence.  We  should  plan  to  continue  a  wide  range  of  forward  presence  activities, 
including  not  only  overseas  basing  of  forces,  but  prepositioning  and  periodic 
deployments,  exercises,  exchanges  or  visits  of  forces.  Forward  basing  of  forces 
and  the  prepositioning  of  equipment  facilitate  rapid  reinforcement  and  enhance  the 
capability  to  project  forces  into  critical  regions. 

Forward  bases  and  access  agreements  must  become  more  flexible  as  the 
security  environment  evolves.  But  they  must  remain  oriented  toward  providing 
visible,  though  unobtrusive,  presence  and  a  forward  staging  area  for  responding  to 
crises  large  and  small  Forward  bases  are  critical  to  successfully  implementing  our 
strategy  at  reduced  farce  levels. 

In  regions  of  the  world  where  we  lack  a  land-based  presence,  maritime 
forces  (including  afloat  prepositioned  equipment),  long-range  aviation,  and  other 
contingency  forces  allow  us  to  exert  presence  and  underscore  our  commitment  to 
friends  and  allies,  and,  when  necessary,  aid  our  response  to  crises.  Exercises, 
occasional  deployments,  prepositioning,  defense  exchanges  and  visits  build  trust, 
cooperation  and  common  operating  procedures  between  militaries.  Important,  too, 
are  host  nation  arrangements  to  provide  the  infrastructure  and  logistical  support  to 
allow  for  the  forward  deployment  or  projection  of  forces  when  necessary. 

Our  forward  forces  should  increasingly  be  prepared  to  fulfill  multiple 
regional  roles,  and  in  some  cases  extra-regional  roles,  rather  than  being  prepared 
only  for  operations  in  the  locale  where  they  are  based.  Moreover,  as  in  the  Gulf 
War,  our  forward  presence  forces  must  be  ready  to  provide  support  for  military 
operations  in  other  theaters.  In  addition,  through  forward  presence,  we  can 
prosecute  the  war  on  drugs;  provide  humanitarian  and  security  assistance  and 
support  for  peacekeeping  operations;  evacuate  U.S.  citizens  in  danger  abroad;  and 
advance  defense- to-defense  contacts  to  strengthen  democratic  reforms. 


Forward  presence  is  a  crucial  element  of  the  new  regional  strategy,  and  a 
major  factor  in  overall  conventional  (including  special  operations)  force  size. 
Generally  forces  for  forward  presence  (including  associated  CONUS -based  forces 
for  rotation)  must  be  predominantly  in  the  active  components.  As  we  reduce  force 
structure  to  base  force  levels,  each  military  department  must  seek  innovative  ways 
to  continue  providing  the  crucial  benefits  of  forward  presence  -  both  political  and 
operational  ~  with  acceptable  impact  on  the  smaller  force.  This  calls  for  exploring 
new  ways  of  operating  forces  in  peacetime.  Areas  to  consider  include  increasing 
the  use  of  periodic  visits  of  forces,  possibly  both  active  and  reserve,  for  training  or 
exercises;  innovative  manning  or  maintenance  practices;  additional  overseas 
homeporting;  combined  planning;  and  security  and  humanitarian  assistance. 

Precipitous  reductions  in  forward  presence  may  unsettle  security  relations. 
Where  forward  bases  are  involved,  due  attention  must  be  paid  to  minimizing  the 
impact  of  dislocations  on  military  families.  Planned  reductions  should  be 
undertaken  deliberately,  with  careful  attention  to  making  in-course  adjustments  as 
necessary. 


Crisis  Response.  The  ability  to  respond  to  regional  or  local  crises  is  a 
key  element  of  the  Regional  Defense  Strategy.  The  regional  and  local  contingencies 
we  might  face  are  many  and  varied,  both  in  size  and  intensity,  potentially  involving 
a  broad  range  of  military  farces  of  varying  capabilities  and  technological 
sophistication  under  an  equally  broad  range  of  geopolitical  circumstances.  Highly 
ready  and  rapidly  deployable  power  projection  forces,  including  forcible  entry 
forces,  remain  key  means  of  precluding  challengers,  of  protecting  our  interests 
from  unexpected  or  sudden  challenges,  and  of  achieving  decisive  results  if  the  use 
of  force  is  necessary. 

During  the  Cold  War,  Americans  understood  that  national  survival  was  at 
stake  and  that  a  long,  drawn-out  and  costly  war  could  result.  In  regional  conflicts, 
our  stake  may  seem  less  apparent.  We  should  provide  forces  with  capabilities  that 
minimize  the  need  to  trade  American  lives  with  tyrants  and  aggressors  who  do  not 
care  about  their  own  people.  Thus,  our  response  to  regional  crises  must  be 
decisive,  requiring  the  high-quality  personnel  and  technological  edge  to  win  quickly 
and  with  minimum  casualties.  A  decisive  force  will  not  always  be  a  large-scale 
force;  sometimes  a  measured  military  action  can  contain  or  preclude  a  crisis,  or 
otherwise  obviate  a  much  larger,  more  costly  operation.  But  when  we  choose  to 
act,  we  must  be  capable  of  acting  quickly  and  effectively.  We  must  be  prepared  to 
make  regional  aggressors  fight  on  our  terms,  matching  our  strengths  against  their 
weaknesses. 

Consequently,  crisis  response  requires  maintaining  a  broad  range  of 
capabilities,  particularly  emphasizing  high  readiness  forces  sufficient  to  enable 
response  to  short- warning  contingencies;  sufficient  munitions  and  spares;  adequate 
intelligence  capabilities;  enhanced  mobility  to  enable  us  to  deploy  sizable  forces 
long  distances  on  short  notice;  and  a  number  of  specific  enhancements  growing  out 
of  lessons  learned  from  the  Gulf  War. 

Our  strategy  further  recognizes  that  when  the  United  States  is  engaged, 
perhaps  in  concert  with  others,  in  a  substantial  regional  crisis  or  is  committed  to  a 
more  prolonged  operation,  potential  aggressors  in  other  areas  may  be  tempted  to 
exploit  our  preoccupation.  Under  these  circumstances,  our  forces  must  remain  able 


to  deter  or  to  respond  rapidly  to  other  crises  or  to  expand  an  initial  crisis 
deployment  in  the  event  of  escalation,  also  on  short  notice. 

The  short  notice  that  may  characterize  many  regional  crises  requires  highly 
responsive  military  forces.  Required  military  personnel  will  be  maintained  in  dial 
component  of  the  Total  Force  -  active  or  reserve  --  in  which  they  can  most 
effectively,  including  with  minimum  casualties,  and  most  economically  accomplish 
required  missions.  This  generally  requires  forces  for  forward  presence  (including 
associated  CONUS-based  forces  for  rotation)  and  combat  farces  and  initial  support 
forces  for  crisis  response  to  be  predominantly  in  the  active  components.  Reserve 
components  will  fulfill  vital  contingency  roles,  primarily  including  mobility  and 
selected  critical  support  for  initially  deploying  farces;  increasing  increments  of 
support  for  continuing  and  expanding  deployments;  and  increasing  increments  of 
combat  capability  as  well,  especially  for  large,  protracted  and/or  concurrent 
contingencies. 

The  crisis  response  element  of  the  strategy  also  has  important  implications 
for  our  inter-  and  intra-theater  mobility  posture.  Our  crisis  response  forces  will  be 
drawn  largely  from  CONUS,  or  possibly  from  forward  deployed  locations  in  other 
theaters.  Our  mobility  posture  must  be  able  to  supplement  forward  presence  forces 
quickly  and  provide  the  bulk  of  necessary  combat  power  and  suppon. 

Future  regional  conflicts  will  be  complicated  by  increases  in  both  the 
conventional  and  unconventional  capabilities  of  potential  adversaries.  During  the 
Gulf  War  we  had  to  prepare  to  handle  an  adversary  holding  chemical  weapons  and 
biological  agents.  We  remain  concerned  that  a  number  of  potentially  hostile  nations 
are  working  to  develop  nuclear  or  other  unconventional  weapons.  The  threat  of 
regional  adversaries  introducing  nuclear  weapons  would  greatly  complicate  future 
regional  crises.  As  we  learned  from  our  experience  with  Iraq,  it  can  be  extremely 
difficult  to  know  how  far  such  efforts  have  progressed.  Even  relatively  old 
technology,  which  in  fact  will  characterize  tire  vast  majority  of  cases,  can  represent 
a  tremendous  challenge,  as  demonstrated  by  the  Iraqi  use  of  ballistic  missiles  in  the 
Gulf  War. 

The  global  diffusion  of  conventional  military  and  dual-use  technologies  will 
enable  a  growing  number  of  countries  to  field  highly  capable  conventional  weapons 
systems,  such  as  stealthy  cruise  missiles,  integrated  air  defenses,  submarines, 
modem  command  and  control  systems,  and  even  space-based  assets.  Third  World 
countries  attempting  to  acquire  nuclear,  biological,  and  chemical  weapons  will 
undoubtedly  attempt  to  take  advantage  of  economic  distress  in  the  former  Soviet 
Union.  We  have  worked  multi  laterally  to  strengthen  international  regimes  intended 
to  halt  the  diffusion  of  these  weapons  and  technologies,  and  bilaterally  to  stop 
unauthorized  leakage. 

U.S.  forces  must  be  capable  of  operating  against  adversaries  who  possess 
weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Active  defenses  (including  existing  theater  missile 
defense  assets  and  future  assets  for  global  protection  against  limited  strikes), 
passive  defenses  (including  detection  capabilities,  more  effective  vehicle  crew- 
compartment  protective  systems,  and  vaccines),  and  specialized  intelligence  will  be 
needed.  If  the  use  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  is  threatened,  we  may  need  to 
win  even  more  quickly  ami  decisively,  and  we  would  still  want  to  retain  the 
advantages  necessary  to  keep  our  own  losses  as  low  as  possible.  (Further 
discussion  of  WMD  issues  is  found  in  the  Strategic  Deterrence  and  Defense 
section.) 


17 


The  Gulf  War  provides  a  host  of  lessons  that  should  continue  to  guide 
future  crisis  response  planning.  The  Department  should  selectively  focus 
investment  on  the  following  high-priority  areas:  rapidly  deployable  anti-armor 
capabilities;  enhanced  combat  abilities  to  identify  friendly  forces  and  thus  reduce 
casualties  from  misdirected  friendly  fire;  improved  naval  and  land  mine  and 
countermine  capabilities;  defenses  against  chemical  and  biological  weapons  and 
agents;  defenses  against  tactical  ballistic  and  cruise  missiles;  improved  capabilities 
for  pr  jcision  air  strikes;  improved  integration  and  flexibility  of  tactical  command, 
control,  communications  and  intelligence;  and  improved  national-level  intelligence. 
More  generally,  the  Department  also  should  apply  the  relevant  lessons  of  the  Gulf 
War  identified  in  the  Final  Report  to  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  Persian  Gulf 
War  and  other  subsequent  reports.  A  complete  understanding  of  the  war  and  its 
implications  for  U.S.  forces  will  continue  to  evolve  for  some  time  to  come. 

Finally,  we  must  be  prepared  for  crises  and  contingencies  stemming  from 
low-intensity  conflict,  which  includes  terrorism,  insurgency,  and  subversion.  In 
response  to  these  threats  to  our  interests,  we  must  be  prepared  to  undertake  smaller- 
scade  operations  that  require  forces  using  specialized  skills,  equipment,  or 
approaches.  Such  operations  include  non-combatant  evacuations,  peacekeeping 
missions,  hostage  rescues,  and  counterinsurgency  and  counterterrorism  operations. 


Reconstitution.  With  the  demise  of  the  Cold  War,  we  have  gained 
sufficient  strategic  depth  that  potential  global-scale  threats  to  our  security  are  now 
very  distant  --  so  much  so  that  they  are  hard  to  identify  or  define  with  precision. 

The  new  strategy,  therefore,  prudently  reduces  spending  and  accepts  risk  in  this 
lower  probability  area  of  threat  in  order  to  refocus  reduced  defense  resources  both 
on  die  more  likely  near-term  threats  and  on  high  priority  investments  in  the 
enduring  requirements  of  our  strategy. 

The  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  has  made  it  much  less  likely  that  a 
global  conventional  challenge  to  U.S.  and  Western  security  will  reemerge  from  the 
Eurasian  heartland  for  many  years  to  come  -  at  least  for  the  balance  of  this  decade. 
Even  if,  for  example,  some  future  Russian  leadership  were  to  adopt  strategic  aims 
threatening  a  global  challenge  similar  to  that  presented  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  the 
Cold  War,  current  estimates  are  that  such  force  reconstitution  efforts  would  allow 
several  years  or  more  of  U.SVallied  response  time,  and  could  only  happen  after  an 
authoritarian  reversal  and  systemic  realignment  itself  spanning  several  years. 

Nevertheless,  we  could  still  face  in  the  more  distant  future  a  new  global 
threat  or  some  emergent  alliance  of  hostile,  nondemocradc  regional  powers.  For 
the  longer  term,  then,  our  reconstitution  strategy  focuses  on  supporting  our  national 
security  policy  to  preclude  the  development  of  a  global  threat  contrary  to  the 
interests  of  the  United  States.  Should  such  a  threat  begin  to  emerge,  we  would  use 
die  available  lead  time  to  forestall  or  counter  it  at  the  lowest  possible  levels  of 
militarization.  Our  reconstitution  strategy  seeks  to  provide  sufficient  capability  to 
create  additional  new  forces  and  capabilities  to  deter  and  defend  our  interests  as 
necessary,  drawing  on  “regeneration”  assets  (cadre-type  units  and  stored 
equipment),  industrial/technology  base  assets,  and  manpower  assets. 

Reconstitution  should  use  low-cost  assets  to  provide  an  inexpensive  hedge. 
As  we  draw  down  the  force,  Cold  War  investments  present  opportunities  for  "smart 
lay-away"  of  long-lead  elements  of  force  structure  or  production  capability  that 


offer  a  high-leverage  reconstitution  hedge  at  quite  modest  cost,  or  might  become 
useful  to  a  friendly  nation  facing  a  major  threat 

Measures  planned  and  used  for  response  to  early  indications  of  a  specific 
reconstitution  threat  must  strike  a  careful  balance  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
needs  to  demonstrate  resolve,  strengthen  deterrence,  and  begin  enhancing  military 
capabilities,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  imperative  to  avoid  provocative  steps  and  to 
maintain  the  ability  to  arrest  or  reverse  our  steps  without  creating  military 
vulnerabilities. 


Translating  the  Elements  into  Forces  and  Programs.  Our  forces 
and  programs  have  been  designed  and  sized  as  a  coherent  whole  to  support  the 
elements  of  our  new  regional  defense  strategy,  carefully  weighing  present  and 
future  challenges.  The  restructuring  needed  to  support  our  new  strategy  also  calls 
for  a  shift  from  program  planners’  traditional  four  “pillars”  of  military  capability 
(readiness,  sustainability,  modernization,  and  force  structure)  to  six  pillars.  We 
have  divided  the  modernization  pillar,  distinguishing  science  and  technology  from 
systems  acquisition,  to  make  explicit  the  higher  relative  priority  of  science  and 
technology  in  this  new  era.  We  have  designated  infrastructure  and  overhead  as  a 
new  pillar,  to  explicitly  focus  on  the  need  for  cuts  in  overhead  in  this  time  of  major 
cuts  in  fighting  capability. 

Accordingly,  we  have  adopted  these  relative  priorities  among  the  new  six 
“pillars”  of  defense  resources: 

•  Readiness  •  Force  Structure 

•  Sustainability 

•  Science  and  Technology 

•  Systems  Acquisition 

•  Infrastructure  and  Overhead 

Specifically,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  to  maintain  fares  of  high  readiness  and 
adequate  size.  Of  lower  but  still  high  priority  is  the  sustainability  sufficient  for  the 
intensity  and  duration  of  regional  conflicts.  The  new  strategy  also  gives  high 
priority  to  selected  science  and  technology  to  keep  our  qualitative  edge  in  systems 
and  in  doctrine.  By  contrast,  a  profound  slowing  in  former  Soviet  modernization 
that  long  drove  our  programs  enables  greatly  reduced  emphasis  on  systems 
acquisition,  and  a  fundamentally  new  approach  to  overall  defense  acquisition. 
Finally,  the  Department  must  vigorously  pursue  reductions  and  management 
efficiencies  in  defense  infrastructure  and  overhead,  continuing  the  vigorous  pursuit 
of  savings  initiated  under  the  Defense  Management  Review.  This  relative  priority 
among  the  new  “six  pillars”  aims  to  reduce  our  cost  of  doing  business  and  direct 
our  shrinking  resources  to  ensuring  very  high  quality,  ready  forces  and  rigorous 
technical  and  doctrinal  innovation. 


HI.  REGIONAL  GOALS  AND  CHALLENGES 


We  can  take  advantage  of  the  Cold  War’s  end  and  the  dissolution  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  shift  our  planning  focus  to  regional  threats  and  challenges.  The 
future  of  events  in  major  regions  remains  uncertain.  Regional  and  local  actors  may 
pursue  hostile  agendas  through  direct  confrontation  or  through  such  indirect  means 
as  subversion  and  terrorism.  The  new  defense  strategy,  with  its  focus  on  regional 
matters,  seeks  to  shape  this  uncertain  future  and  position  us  to  retain  the  capabilities 
needed  to  protect  our  interests.  With  this  focus  we  should  work  with  our  Mends 
and  allies  to  preclude  the  emergence  of  hostile,  nondemocratic  threats  to  our  critical 
interests  and  to  shape  a  more  secure  international  environment  conducive  to  our 
democratic  ideals. 


Europe 

We  confront  a  Europe  in  the  midst  of  historic  transformation,  no  longer 
starkly  divided  between  the  Soviet-dominated  Warsaw  Pact  and  the  Western 
Alliance.  We  have  made  great  strides  toward  a  Europe  "whole  and  free."  We  are 
striving  to  aid  the  efforts  in  the  former  Eastern  bloc  to  build  free  societies.  Over  the 
long  term,  the  most  effective  guarantee  that  the  former  Soviet  empire's  successor 
states  do  not  threaten  U.S.  and  Western  interests  is  successful  democratization  and 
economic  reform. 

The  breakup  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  presents  an  historic  opportunity  to 
transform  the  adversarial  relationship  of  the  Cold  War  into  a  relationship 
characterized  by  cooperation  as  articulated  in  the  Washington  Charter  signed  by 
Presidents  Bush  and  Yeltsin  in  June  of  1992.  But  we  must  recognize  what  we  arc 
so  often  told  by  the  leaders  of  the  new  democracies  -  that  continued  U.S.  presence 
in  Europe  is  an  essential  part  of  the  West's  overall  efforts  to  maintain  stability  even 
in  the  midst  of  such  dramatic  change.  History  has  demonstrated  that  our  own 
security  is  inseparably  linked  to  that  of  Europe.  It  is  of  fundamental  importance  to 
preserve  NATO  as  the  primary  instrument  of  Western  defense  and  security,  as  well 
as  the  channel  for  U.S.  engagement  and  participation  in  larger  European  security 
affairs,  even  as  we  work  increasingly  with  the  other  institutions  emerging  in 
Europe. 

Our  common  security  and  European  stability  can  be  enhanced  by  the  further 
development  of  a  network  of  interlocking  institutions  that,  in  conjunction  with 
NATO,  constitute  the  emerging  security  architecture  of  Europe.  We  should  work 
within  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  and  the 
North  Atlantic  Cooperation  Council  (NACC)  and  with  the  European  Community 
(EC)  and  the  Western  European  Union  (WEU)  to  promote  security  and  stability. 
Emerging  frameworks  of  regional  cooperation  also  will  be  important 

Even  as  European  institutions  grow,  we  need  to  strengthen  Alliance 
cohesion,  and  to  develop  new  common  understandings  of  how  the  Alliance  can 
respond  collectively  to  nxture  challenges.  Our  European  friends  and  allies  should 
be  encouraged  to  assume  a  greater  share  of  the  burden  in  maintaining  world  order 
and  protecting  common  interests  worldwide.  Important  security  interests  are  at 
stake  for  both  the  Europeans  and  for  us  in  many  areas,  including  notably  Eastern 
Europe,  the  Middle  East/Persian  Gulf,  and  the  Mediterranean,  including  North 
Africa. 


20 


In  June  1992,  the  North  Atlantic  Council  of  NATO  agreed  to  support  CSCE 
peacekeeping  activities  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  In  the  former  Yugoslavia,  NATO 
has  deployed  its  Standing  Naval  Farce  Mediterranean  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  to  assist 
with  UN  sanctions,  while  NATO  AW  ACS  are  helping  to  monitor  the  no-fly  zone 
over  Bosnia- Herzegovina.  NATO  defense  ministers  in  December  1992  agreed  to 
refine  NATO’s  capability  for  such  peacekeeping  operations.  They  announced  that 
support  for  UN  and  CSCE  peacekeeping  should  be  included  among  the  missions  of 
NATO  forces  and  headquarters  and  tasked  their  permanent  representatives  to 
identify  specific  measures  to  enhance  NATO’s  peacekeeping  capabilities. 

As  NATO  continues  to  provide  the  indispensable  foundation  for  a  stable 
security  environment  in  Europe,  it  is  of  fundamental  importance  to  preserve 
NATO's  integrated  military  command  structure.  While  U.S.  forces  will  continue  to 
be  stationed  on  the  continent  and  contiguous  maritime  areas,  the  new  threat 
environment  will  enable  us  to  reduce  their  number,  and  they  may,  in  part,  play 
more  specialized  roles.  But  our  objective  should  be  to  preserve  a  substantial  level 
of  U.S.  farces  in  Western  Europe  with  sufficient  organic  combat  and  support 
capabilities  to  maintain  the  viability  of  the  Alliance;  promote  peaceful  progress  in 
Europe;  permit  the  timely  reinforcement  of  Europe  should  there  be  a  reemergence  of 
a  significant  threat;  and  support  out-of-area  contingencies.  The  peaceful  defense-to- 
defense  contacts  between  our  forces  in  Europe  and  the  militaries  in  Eastern  Europe 
and  the  farmer  Soviet  Union  also  can  be  a  force  for  peace. 

To  retain  meaningful  operational  capabilities,  our  objective  for  U.S.  ground 
forces  in  Western  Europe  should  be  a  capable  corps.  We  can  also  reduce  our 
tactical  fighter  wing  presence  by  half  or  mare.  We  have  eliminated  ground-based 
nuclear  forces  in  Europe  and  withdrawn  U.S.  tactical  nuclear  weapons  at  sea,  but 
U.S.  dual-capable  aircraft  and  their  nuclear  weapons  remain  based  in  Europe;  this 
preserves  the  alliance's  historic  emphasis  on  extended  deterrence.  These  reductions 
translate  to  a  presence  of  less  than  half  the  level  of  our  forces  at  the  beginning  of  the 
decade.  NATO  itself  has  adapted,  through  a  new  strategic  concept  that  proposes 
smaller  and  multinational  forces  with  increased  mobility  and  an  emphasis  on  crisis 
management  As  U.S.  forces  stationed  in  Europe  become  smaller,  they  must 
remain  capable  of  responding  to  crises  throughout  and  outside  of  die  region. 

The  end  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  the  emergence  of  democratic  stares  in 
Eastern  Europe  is  a  development  of  immense  strategic  significance.  It  is  critical  to 
U.S.  interests  in  Europe  and  those  of  our  allies  that  we  assist  the  new  democracies 
in  Eastern  Europe  to  consolidate  their  democratic  institutions,  establish  free  market 
economies  and  safeguard  their  national  independence.  Regional  security  challenges 
work  to  divert  their  efforts  from  these  ends  and  endanger  their  progress.  The 
continued  ascendancy  of  democratic  reformers  in  Russia,  Ukraine  and  other  stares 
of  Eastern  Europe  would  be  the  surest  counter  to  concerns  raised  by  the  long 
history  of  conflict  in  the  region. 

Security  and  democratization  in  the  former  Eastern  Bloc  also  would  be 
enhanced  by  mutual  cooperation  among  the  Eastern  Europeans  as  well  as  with  the 
United  States,  NATO  and  other  Western  Allies.  NATO  can  assist  the  Eastern 
Europeans  in  reevaluating  their  defense  postures.  We  must  increase  our  defense-to- 
defense  contacts  with  countries  of  both  die  former  Soviet  Union  and  the  countries 
of  Eastern  Europe.  These  contacts  should  strive  to  underscore  to  the  military 
leaders  of  these  new  democracies  the  importance  of  civilian  control  of  the  military 
through  die  institutions  of  democratic  government  We  also  must  assist  the  Eastern 


Europeans  in  reforming  their  military  institutions  as  they  institute  new  national 
defense  doctrines  to  replace  the  offensive  posture  associated  with  the  Warsaw  Pact 

The  United  States  has  a  significant  stake  in  promoting  democratic 
consolidation  within  and  peaceful  relations  among  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  other  new 
states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union.  A  democratic  partnership  with  Russia,  Ukraine, 
and  the  other  new  states  would  be  the  best  possible  outcome.  If  democracy  matures 
in  Russia  and  Ukraine  there  is  every  possibility  that  they  will  be  a  force  for  peace 
not  only  in  Europe,  but  in  other  regions  where  previously  Soviet  policy  aggravated 
local  conditions  and  encouraged  unrest  and  conflict 

Our  increasing  defense-to- defense  contacts  with  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  the 
other  new  states  should  support  the  peaceful  resolution  of  differences  among  them 
and  help  in  fostering  democratic  philosophies  of  civil-military  relations  through  the 
institutions  of  democratic  government,  transparency,  and  defensive  military 
doctrines  and  postures.  We  also  can  further  our  concerns  and  those  of  our  allies  by 
assisting  the  efforts  of  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  the  other  new  states  to  reduce 
dramatically  the  military  burden  on  their  societies,  further  reduce  their  forces, 
convert  excess  military  industries  to  civilian  production,  assist  efforts  to  dismantle 
and  dispose  of  nuclear  weapons  safely  and  maintain  firm  command  and  control 
over  those  that  remain,  and  prevent  leakage  of  advanced  military  technology  and 
expertise  to  other  countries.  Military  budget  cuts  in  Russia  and  the  other  new  states 
will  significantly  improve  the  chances  of  democratic  consolidations  and 
demilitarization  by  freeing  up  resources  for  more  productive  investments  and  thus 
improving  the  chance  of  economic  success. 

At  the  same  time,  as  we  work  to  strengthen  democracy,  we  must  consider 
the  possibility  that  undemocratic  regimes  could  emerge  in  some  of  the  new  states 
and  seek  to  remilitarize  their  policies  and  societies.  Our  challenge  and  that  of  our 
allies  is  to  maintain  our  collective  capacity  to  defend  against  an  aggressive  regime  in 
such  a  way  that  we  do  not  disrupt  future  cooperation  with  a  democratic  state  or 
weaken  the  chances  of  successful  reform.  Overall,  we  strengthen  the  hand  of 
democracy  if  our  opposition  to  aggression  is  clear  and  there  is  a  common 
understanding  that  the  potential  remains  for  strong  collective  response  to 
aggression. 


East  Asia/Pacific 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  hold  enormous  strategic  and  economic  importance 
for  us  and  our  allies.  Japan  and  Korea  together  represent  almost  sixteen  percent  of 
the  world  economy;  China  alone  holds  a  quarter  of  the  world’s  population.  U.S. 
two-way  trade  with  the  region  stands  at  $310  billion,  approximately  one  third  more 
than  die  total  of  our  two-way  trade  with  Europe.  In  addition,  East  Asia  remains  an 
area  of  enormous  concentration  of  military  power,  actual  and  latent,  nuclear  and 
conventional.  The  area  contains  either  within  it  or  on  its  periphery  many  of  the 
largest  armies  in  the  world,  including  those  of  Russia,  China,  India,  the  two 
Koreas,  and  Vietnam. 

To  buttress  the  vital  political  and  economic  relationships  we  have  along  the 
Pacific  rim,  we  must  main  tarn  a  significant  military  presence  in  the  area,  which  even 
before  current  reductions  in  Asia  represented  only  a  small  proportion  of  U.S.  forces 
woridwide.  We  must  maintain  sufficient  forward  deployed  forces  and  power 
projection  capability  to  reassure  our  regional  allies  and  friends,  to  preclude 


destabilizing  military  rivalries,  to  secure  freedom  of  the  seas,  to  deter  threats  to  our 
key  political  and  economic  interests,  and  to  preclude  any  hostile  power  from 
attempting  to  dominate  the  region.  A  strong  U.S.  military  position,  welcomed  by 
leaders  throughout  the  region,  promotes  conditions  conducive  to  realization  of 
objectives  we  share:  democratization,  protection  of  human  rights,  peaceful  political 
change,  and  the  spread  of  market  economies  and  prosperity.  Our  forces  in  the 
region  also  support  other  of  our  U.S.  security  objectives,  as  recendy  demonstrated 
by  the  reliance  on  Pacific  military  facilities  and  forces  to  help  project  power  into  the 
Persian  Gulf. 

We  must  work  to  preserve  our  vigorous  security  alliances,  especially  with 
Japan,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Australia,  Thailand,  and  the  Philippines.  We  should 
continue  to  encourage  Japan  and  South  Korea  in  particular  to  assume  greater 
responsibility  sharing,  urging  both  to  increase  prudently  their  defensive  capabilities 
to  deal  with  threats  and  responsibilities  they  face  and  to  assume  a  greater  share  of 
financial  support  for  U.S.  forward  deployed  forces  that  contribute  to  their  security. 
Japanese  contributions  in  securing  maritime  approaches  is  one  example.  We  also 
should  persist  in  efforts  to  ensure  an  equitable,  two-way  flow  of  technology  in  our 
security  cooperation  with  advanced  allies  such  as  Japan.  We  must  plan  to  continue 
to  safeguard  critical  sea  lines  of  communications  linking  us  to  our  allies  and  trading 
partners. 

As  our  Pacific  friends  and  allies  are  assuming  greater  responsibility  for  their 
defense,  we  can  restructure  our  forces  and  reduce  the  number  of  ground  and 
support  farces  forward  deployed  there.  An  appropriate  framework  for  adjustments 
to  our  forward-deployed  forces  in  the  region  is  outlined  in  the  East  Asia  Strategy 
Initiative  as  reported  to  Congress.  In  Phase  I  of  our  planned  withdrawals  more 
than  25,000  troops  were  withdrawn  from  bases  in  East  Asia  by  December  1992. 
This  includes  the  withdrawal  from  the  Philippines.  Plans  to  remove  additional 
forces  from  South  Korea  have  been  suspended  while  we  address  the  problem  posed 
by  the  North  Korean  nuclear  program.  In  time  we  should  look  to  implement 
Phases  II  and  HI  of  the  East  Asia  Strategy  Initiative,  with  the  objective  of  keeping 
substantial  forces  forward  deployed  in  Asia  for  the  foreseeable  future. 

Despite  recent  positive  trends  toward  political  liberalization  and  market- 
oriented  economic  reforms,  die  East  Asia  and  Pacific  region  continues  to  be 
burdened  by  several  legacies  of  the  Cold  Wan  the  Soviet  annexation  of  the 
Northern  Territories  of  Japan,  the  division  of  the  Korean  Peninsula,  and  the  civil 
war  in  Cambodia.  The  end  of  Communism  in  Europe  is  likely  to  bring  pressure  on 
remaining  Communist  regimes  with  unknown  consequences  for  regional  stability. 
We  should  continue  to  advance  our  relations  with  China  on  a  realistic  basis  but  also 
should  ensure  that  Taiwan  has  the  armaments  needed  to  defend  itself  as  provided  by 
die  Taiwan  Relations  Act,  while  taking  into  account  the  August  1982  Communique 
with  China  on  Taiwan  arms  sales.  We  should  work  to  curtail  proliferation  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  to  advance  democracy,  freedom,  and  human 
rights  in  the  countries  of  the  region  that  lack  them. 

Our  most  active  regional  security  concern  in  Asia  remains  the  military  threat 
posed  by  North  Korea  to  our  treaty  ally,  the  Republic  of  Korea.  Our  concerns  are 
mtenriffed  by  North  Korea’s  efforts  to  develop  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and 
delivery  systems.  Although  we  have  begun  some  reductions  in  our  forces  as  part 
of  shifting  greater  responsibility  to  our  ally,  we  must  maintain  sufficient  military 
capabilities  together  with  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  deter  aggression  by  the  North  or 
to  defeat  it  should  deterrence  fail  Our  overall  objective  with  regard  to  the  Korean 


23 


peninsula  should  remain  to  support  its  peaceful  unification  on  terms  acceptable  to 
the  Korean  people  which  foster  democracy,  freedom,  and  observance  of  human 
rights. 


The  emergence  of  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  as 
an  increasingly  influential  regional  actor  has  been  an  important  positive 
development  ASEAN's  population  of  320  million  is  almost  twice  that  of  Japan 
and  Korea  combined.  Southeast  Asia  is  a  region  of  increasing  economic  strength. 
By  the  end  of  the  century,  the  combined  ASEAN  economies  are  forecasted  to  reach 
$80 0  billion,  over  $100  billion  larger  than  China’s.  The  United  States  shares  an 
interest  with  the  ASEAN  countries  in  precluding  Southeast  Asia  from  becoming  an 
area  of  strategic  competition  among  regional  powers. 

With  regard  to  U.S.  bases  in  Southeast  Asia,  we  have  withdrawn  our  forces 
from  the  Philippines,  consistent  with  the  desires  of  the  Philippine  government.  At 
the  same  time,  we  have  sought  to  broaden  our  network  of  access  agreements  similar 
to  the  recently  concluded  Singapore  access  memorandum  in  lieu  of  permanent  bases 
throughout  Southeast  Asia.  These  kinds  of  agreements  will  facilitate  bilateral 
training,  exercises,  and  interoperability,  thereby  enhancing  our  ability  to  work  with 
allies  and  friends  in  crisis. 

The  Australia-New  Zealand-United  States  (ANZUS)  alliance  relationship 
remains  an  important  component  of  our  security  architecture  in  the  Pacific,  although 
security  guarantees  to  New  Zealand  are  presently  suspended  because  of  New 
Zealand's  failure  to  live  up  to  its  alliance  obligations.  Our  goal  should  remain  to 
strengthen  our  partnership  with  Australia  and  work  to  remove  obstacles  to 
reintegrating  New  Zealand  as  a  full  partner  in  ANZUS. 

As  is  the  case  in  other  regions,  proliferation  remains  a  central  concern  in 
Asia.  Where  appropriate,  as  on  the  Korean  peninsula,  we  can  explore  selective 
conventional  arms  control  and  confidence  building  measures  that  enhance  stability. 
We  should  pursue  our  cooperation  with  friendly  regional  states,  including 
assistance  to  combat  insurgency,  terrorism,  and  drug  trafficking. 


The  MiddU  East/Persian  Gulf  and  South  Asia 

In  die  Middle  East  and  Persian  Gulf,  we  should  seek  to  foster  regional 
stability,  deter  aggression  against  our  friends  and  interests  in  the  region,  protect 
U.S.  nationals  and  property,  and  safeguard  our  access  to  international  air  and 
seaways  and  to  the  region's  important  sources  of  oil.  We  should  strive  to 
encourage  a  peace  process  that  brings  about  reconciliation  between  Israel  and  the 
Arab  states  as  well  as  between  Palestinians  and  Israel  in  a  manner  consonant  with 
our  enduring  commitment  to  Israel's  security.  Some  near-term  dangers  are 
alleviated  with  the  defeat  of  Iraqi  forces,  but  we  must  recognize  that  regional 
dynamics  can  change  and  a  rejuvenated  Iraq  or  a  rearmed  Iran  could  move  in  this 
decade  to  dominate  die  Gulf  and  its  resources.  We  must  remain  prepared  to  act 
decisively  in  the  Middle  East/Persian  Gulf  region  as  we  did  in  Operations  Desen 
Shield  and  Desen  Storm  if  our  vital  interests  there  are  threatened  anew.  We  also 
must  be  prepared  to  counter  the  terrorism,  insurgency,  and  subversion  that 
adversaries  may  use  to  threaten  governments  supportive  of  U.S.  security  interests. 


The  Gulf  War  has  greatly  enhanced  our  security  relations  in  the  Middle 
East/Persian  Gulf  region  and  underscored  their  continued  importance.  Taken 


together,  many  facets  of  this  experience  --  cooperation  in  combat,  logistical 
support,  and  financial  participation  --  and  our  subsequent  cooperation  on  forward 
presence  of  U.S.  forces  promise  continued  close  ties  with  nations  of  the  region  on 
which  we  can  build. 

To  discourage  the  rise  of  a  challenger  hostile  to  our  interests  in  the  region, 
we  must  maintain  a  level  of  forward  military  presence  adequate  to  reassure  our 
friends  and  deter  aggressors  and  present  a  credible  crisis  response  capability.  In 
consultation  with  our  regional  friends,  we  should  increase  our  presence  compared 
to  the  pre-Gulf  War  period.  We  will  want  to  have  the  capability  to  return  forces 
quickly  to  the  region  should  that  ever  be  necessary.  We  also  should  strengthen  our 
bilateral  security  ties  and  encourage  active  regional  collective  defense. 

We  can  strengthen  stability  throughout  the  region  by  sustaining  and 
improving  the  self-defense  capabilities  of  our  regional  friends.  The  United  States  is 
committed  to  the  security  of  Israel  and  to  maintaining  the  qualitative  edge  that  is 
critical  to  Israel's  security.  Israel's  confidence  in  its  security  and  U.S.-Israel 
strategic  cooperation  contribute  to  stability,  as  demonstrated  once  again  during  the 
Persian  Gulf  War.  At  the  same  time,  our  assistance  to  our  Arab  friends  to  defend 
themselves  against  aggression  also  strengthens  security  throughout  the  region, 
including  for  Israel. 

We  can  help  our  friends  meet  their  legitimate  defensive  needs  with  U.S. 
foreign  military  and  commercial  sales  without  jeopardizing  power  balances  in  the 
region.  We  should  tailor  our  security  assistance  programs  to  enable  our  friends  to 
bear  better  the  burden  of  defense  and  to  facilitate  standardization  and  interoperability 
of  recipient  country  forces  with  our  own.  We  must  focus  these  programs  to  enable 
our  regional  friends  to  modernize  their  forces,  upgrade  their  defense  doctrines  and 
planning,  and  acquire  essential  defensive  capabilities. 

We  should  build  on  existing  bilateral  ties  and  negotiate  needed  agreements 
to  enhance  military  access  and  piepositioning  arrangements  and  other  types  of 
defense  cooperation.  These  protocols  will  strengthen  and  broaden  the  individual 
and  collective  defense  of  friendly  states. 

The  infusion  of  new  and  improved  conventional  arms  and  the  proliferation 
of  ballistic  missiles  and  weapons  of  mass  destruction  during  the  past  decade  have 
dramatically  increased  offensive  capabilities  and  the  potential  danger  from  future 
wars  throughout  die  region.  We  should  continue  to  work  with  all  regional  states  to 
reduce  military  expenditures  for  offensive  weapons  and  reverse  the  proliferation  of 
nuclear,  chemical,  and  biological  weapons  and  long-range  missiles.  We  also 
should  continue  to  work  with  leading  suppliers  of  conventional  weapons  to  the 
region  (as  called  for  in  President  Bush’s  1991  Middle  East  arms  control  initiative) 
to  prevent  the  transfer  of  militarily  significant  technology  and  resources  to  states 
which  might  threaten  U.S.  friends  or  upset  the  regional  balance  of  power. 

We  should  seek  to  maintain  constructive,  cooperative  relations  with  India 
and  Pakistan,  strive  to  moderate  tensions  between  them,  and  endeavor  to  eliminate 
nuclear  arms  programs  on  the  subcontinent  In  this  regard,  we  should  work  in 
South  Asia  as  elsewhere  to  have  all  countries  adhere  to  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  and  to  place  their  nuclear  energy  facilities  under  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  safeguards. 


The  presence  of  drug  production  and  trafficking  and  instances  of 
international  terrorism  complicate  our  relations  with  regional  countries.  The 
Department  should  continue  to  contribute  to  U.S.  counter-terrorism  initiatives  and 
support  the  efforts  of  U.S.  agencies  in  the  region. 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

In  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  the  United  States  seeks  to  sustain  the 
extraordinary  democratic  progress  of  the  last  decade  and  maintain  a  stable  security 
environment  As  in  the  past  the  focus  of  U.S.  security  policy  should  remain 
assisting  democratic  consolidation  and  the  efforts  of  the  democratic  nations  in  the 
region  to  defend  themselves  against  the  threat  posed  by  insurgency  and  terrorism. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  must  assist  its  neighbors  in  combating  the  instability 
engendered  by  illicit  drugs,  as  well  as  continuing  efforts  to  prevent  illegal  drugs 
from  entering  the  United  States. 

Cuba  poses  an  area  of  special  concern  for  the  United  States.  The  end  of 
Warsaw  Pact  subsidies  has  added  to  Cuba’s  economic  decline.  Over  the  near-  to 
mid-term,  Cuba’s  tenuous  internal  situation  and  its  disproportionately  large  military 
could  generate  new  challenges  to  U.S.  policy,  particularly  because  Castro  retains 
the  hostile  intent  that  has  for  decades  sought  to  undermine  democratic  progress  in 
Central  and  South  America. 

The  situation  in  Central  America  will  remain  a  concern.  In  El  Salvador,  we 
should  seek  the  continued  successful  implementation  of  the  agreement  reached  by 
the  Salvadoran  government  and  the  FMLN.  We  also  should  seek  peaceful 
resolution  of  the  conflict  in  Guatemala,  in  Panama,  we  should  seek  to  strengthen 
their  democratic  institutions.  Our  programs  there  must  also  provide  die  capabilities 
to  meet  U.S.  responsibilities  under  the  Panama  Canal  Treaties,  including  defense  of 
the  Canal  after  1999. 

The  small  island- states  of  the  eastern  Caribbean  remain  vulnerable  to 
destabilization.  Assistance  in  economic  development  is  key,  but  we  also  should 
explore  ways  of  strengthening  the  Eastern  Caribbean  Regional  Security  System  to 
strengthen  democracy  in  these  nations. 

Following  implementation  of  the  Panama  Canal  treaty,  we  will  have  no 
permanent  bases  on  the  Latin  America  mainland.  The  general  trend  toward 
democratization  and  peace  in  Latin  America  and  the  dramatic  reductions  of  former 
Soviet  and  East  European  aid  to  Cuba  are  long-sought  developments.  Nonetheless, 
potential  regional  problems  remain,  including  the  potential  far  instability  in  Cuba 
and  elsewhere,  and  the  continuing  challenge  of  stopping  trafficking  in  illegal  drugs 
from  this  region. 

Countering  drug  trafficking  remains  a  high  priority.  Our  counterdrug 
progams  in  the  region  must  focus  on  stemming  the  flow  of  drugs  by  attacking  drug 
trafficking  at  the  source,  in  the  producing  and  refining  countries,  and  along  the 
transit  routes  to  the  United  States. 


Sub-Saharan  Africa 


Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  made  encouraging  progress  toward  democratization 
and  economic  liberalization.  While  seeking  to  facilitate  these  trends  wherever 
possible,  our  continuing  military  role  should  be  to  ensure  the  safety  of  U.S. 
citizens,  including  undertaking  noncombatant  evacuation  operations  when 
necessary;  alleviating  disaster  and  distress  with  humanitarian  assistance; 
strengthening  the  security,  stability,  and  economic  development  of  friendly  states 
and  supporting  their  democratic  development;  and  extending  support  to  international 
peacekeeping  efforts.  Our  commitment  to  alleviating  distress  can  be  seen 
particularly  in  our  role  in  Operation  Restore  Hope  in  Somalia,  striving  to  create  a 
secure  environment  for  the  provision  of  humanitarian  relief  operations.  Out  of  the 
turmoil  in  South  Africa  we  hope  to  see  emerge  a  fully  representative  government 
still  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  supportive  of  Western  interests  in  the  area. 


CONCLUSION 


We  must  preserve  the  extraordinary  environment  that  has  emerged  from  the 
challenges  of  the  Cold  War  —  an  environment  within  which  the  values  of  freedom 
that  we  and  our  principal  allies  hold  dear  can  flourish.  We  can  secure  and  extend  the 
remarkable  democratic  "zone  of  peace"  that  we  and  our  allies  now  enjoy,  preclude 
threats,  and  guard  our  national  interests. 

The  Gulf  War  is  a  vivid  reminder  that  we  cannot  be  sure  when  or  where  the 
next  conflict  will  arise.  In  early  1990,  many  said  there  were  no  threats  left  because 
of  the  Soviet  commitment  to  withdraw  from  Eastern  Europe;  very  few  expected  that 
we  would  be  at  war  within  a  year.  The  experience  of  the  past  century  is  replete 
with  instances  in  which  enormous  strategic  changes  often  arose  unexpectedly  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years  or  even  less.  This  is  not  a  lesson  that  we  should  have  to  keep 
learning  anew. 

As  we  reshape  America's  military  and  reduce  its  size,  we  must  be  careful 
that  we  do  so  in  accordance  with  a  defense  strategy  and  a  plan  that  will  preserve  the 
integrity  of  the  military  capability  that  we  have  so  carefully  built.  If  we  choose 
wisely  today,  we  can  do  well  something  America  has  always  done  badly  before  -- 
we  can  draw  down  our  military  force  at  a  responsible  rate  that  will  not  end  up 
endangering  our  security.  The  new  Regional  Defense  Strategy  has  set  a  course  to 
ensure  our  ability  to  deal  with  potential  threats  and  shape  the  environment  in  ways 
favorable  to  our  security.